Sexuality and Character: from "Love, Sexuality and Matriarchy:About Gender"

Love, sexuality, and matriarchy : about gender, Erich Fromm

Gender and Sexuality

8. Sexuality and Character(1948) P.135

Freud's theory of sex, first published in the beginning of this century, was a challenge to a generation which still had an unshaken belief in the sex taboos of the Victorian age. Freud had shown that the stigmatization of sex resulting in guilt feelings was conducive to neurosis. Furthermore, he had demonstrated that deviations from the so-called normal sexual behavior were not rare monstrosities but a part of the normal sexual aberrations in the adult were remnants of earlier sexual patterns and ought to be understood as neurotic symptoms rather than morally condemned as vices.
In view of the fact that Freud and his school put sexuality into the center of their psychological theory, it is all the more amazing that an extensive survey of sexual behavior has not been undertaken by psychoanalysts prior to Kinsey's report in 1948. One would imagine that his report would be highly welcome to all psychoanalysts as a report on facts which support the general trend of the psychoanalytic position, even though this report deals only with manifest behavior and not with the problem of unconscious motivations and character. However, quite in contrast to this expectation, the Kinsey Report has been received with unfriendly criticism by a number of psychoanalysts (a minority only, I hope). One criticism, for instance, goes as far asserting that Kinsey could not possibly have unearthed such wealth of data in so short a time when, in contrast, psychoanalysts found it very difficult to gather comparative data about one individual even in numerous interviews. Such an argument, indeed, can always be used if one researcher is more successful than his predecessors, but it is obviously not a valid criticism.
In examining the significance of the Kinsey Report from the standpoint of the psychoanalyst, we must first consider the theoretical differences of psychoanalytic schools with regard to the role of sex in human behavior. Freud and his followers assumed that the energy source of human behavior was largely sexual. The assumption was made that the normal development of the libido can be arrested or distorted by the impact of environmental influences, particularly those in early childhood, and that peculiarities of behavior and of character in the adult were rooted in the peculiarities of his sexual desires and aims. The characteristics of a person's sexual life were held to be exemplary for his total personality.
Sadistic strivings, for instance, are a case in point. Freud assumed that sadistic impulses were part of the sexual strivings in the child during a certain period of its development. Provided that this early phase of the child's sexual development remained predominant in his sexual life, he would, as an adult, either develop sadism as a sexual perversion or as a character structure in which the desire to overpower, dominate, and be little his fellow men is paramount.
Another illustration is that of "oral cravings." Freud assumed that before the sexual drive has become focused on the genitals it finds expression in more diffuse ways in connection with other bodily zones. in this view the infant is characterized by the predominance of libidinous pleasure connected with the mouth and its functions of drinking and eating. If this phase of sexual organization becomes fixated, behavior of the adult will still be determined by this underlying oral craving. Such a person will tent "to be fed" and supported by others, to be dependent on them, to want to be taken care of, and to remain essentially passive.
Freud's assumption is that a person's attitude toward others is a sublimation of (or a " reaction formation" against) those sexual strivings which are the dominant ones in his personality; that it is the particular kind of sexual adjustment which determines the emotional adjustment and the kind of interpersonal relationship the individual develops.
Freud tried to account for the dynamic nature of character traits by combining his characterology with his libido theory. In accordance with the type of materialistic thinking prevalent in the natural sciences of the late nineteenth century, which assumed that energy was a substantial rather than a relational concept, Freud believed that the sexual drive was the source of energy for the formation of character. By a number of complicated and brilliant assumptions he explained different character traits as "sublimations" of, or "reaction formations" against, the various forms of the sexual drive. He interpreted the dynamic nature of character traits as an expression of their libidinous source.
The development of psychoanalytic theory led, parallel to the development in the natural sciences emphasizing dynamic interrelations, to a new concept which was based on the relationship of man to others, to nature, and to himself, discarding the older concept of an isolated individual, a "homo psychologicus," This concept was very adequately formulated by H. S. Sullivan in defining psychoanalysis as a "study in interpersonal relations." (Cf. H. S. Sullivan 1940 and 1945) Interpersonal relationships, assumed by Freud to be the result of varying forms of sexual desire, are considered to be the factor determining sexual strivings. In this view it is not sexual behavior that determines character, but character that determines sexual behavior.
A few illustrations may help to understand this "relational" concept. If the dominant trait in a person's character is that of manipulating other people as "things" to be used for one's own purposes (cf. my description of the "marketing orientation" in Fromm 1947a), his sexual attitude will be in accordance with this character trait. This person experiences others as a means of satisfying his sexual needs and at best his principle is that of "fair play," an exchange in which neither partner gives more than he receives. Tn this character orientation sexual relations are experienced as a fair exchange rather than as intimate relatedness and love.
The authoritarian character, whose relation to others is determined by his wish for power and domination, shows the same characteristics also in his sexual attitude, ranging from complete disregard for the sexual partner to pleasure in inflicting physical or emotional pain. In the submissive person, on the other hand, the masochistic tendency to suffer and and to be dominated is a character trait which determines his sexual behavior and often results in impotence and frigidity.
The character orientations which I have just discussed show how sexual aberrations are rooted in a person's character structure. The buying of "love," and sadistic and masochistic perversion are determined by the dominant traits in a person's character just as sexual happiness is based on the person's capacity for love. In the productive person who is capable of relating himself to another person not in terms of "buying" or of conquest and defeat but in terms of equality and mutual respect, sexual desire is an expression and fulfillment of love.
The fact that sexual behavior is determined by character is not in contradiction to the fact that the sexual instinct itself is rooted in the chemistry of our body. This instinct is the root of all forms of sexual behavior, but it is the particular way of satisfying it, not the instinct itself, which is determined by the character structure, by the particular kind of person's relatedness to the world.
Sexual behavior, indeed, offers one of the most distinct clues for the understanding of a person's character. In contrast to almost every other activity, sexual activity by its very nature is private and therefore less patterned and more an expression of individual peculiarities. Furthermore, the intensity of the sexual desire makes sexual behavior less amenable to a person's control.
Thus, while Freud's description of the connection between sexual behavior and character remains valid, our explanation is different. As so often happens in the history of thought the development of theoretical insight is not to be found in the negation of an older theory, but in its reinterpretation. In our view sexual behavior is not the cause but the effect of a person's character structure. Hence, the Kinsey Report, with its wealth of data on sexual behavior, constitutes an invaluable source of information for the student of social psychology and particularly of character.
For centuries sexuality had been stigmatized as morally bad and at best as morally indifferent if sanctioned by the sacrament of marriage. Every sexual activity which was not for the purpose of procreation, and particularly all sexual deviations, were considered to be morally evil. The general assumption underlying this attitude was that man's flesh was a source of corruption and that only by suppressing instinctual demands could goodness be achieved.
Against these moral concepts a rebellion has developed since the beginning of our century, stimulated by the works of men like Freyd and Havelock Ellis. Freud pointed to the fact that the suppression of sex frequently led to the development of neurosis. He accused his culture of sacrificing mental health to the demands of puritan morality. But it seems that another effect of sexual taboos is not less important: the development of intense guilt feeling in every individual. Since every normal human being has sexual strivings from childhood on, these very strivings must become an inexhaustible source of guilt feelings if they are stigmatized by the culture as evil. Guilt feelings make a person prone to submit to authorities which want to use and subdue him for their own ends. Indeed, maturity and happiness conflict with the existence of an all pervasive sense of guilt.
The stigmatization of sex had another most undesirable result: ethics was narrowed down to the small area of sexual behavior, and thus the really significant ethical problems in human behavior were veiled. Morality became almost identified with sexual morality and virtue, with the obedience to the sexual taboos postulated by the culture. Thus the decisive problem of ethics, of man's relatedness to his fellow men, was neglected. Lack of love, indifference, envy, and lust for power were considered to be less significant ethical problems than the respect for sexual conventions. The issue of ethics was befogged by the idea that man's "flesh" was the source of evil. Yet if one studies the history of man, it is not difficult to see that those human traits which are a threat to the peace and happiness of society and of the individual are not sexual passions or other appetites rooted in our physiological makeup, but the irrational "mental" passions like hate, envy, and ambition. Indeed, all physical instinctual appetites, including sex, are harmless even in their deviations and perversions and are no threat to the welfare of the human race in comparison with the damage done by those irrational passions just mentioned.
But while the rebellion against the suppression of sex was a healthy and progressive development it went to the opposite extreme; it arrived at an equally untenable position by maintaining that sexual behavior does not lend itself to any kind of ethical evaluation.
However, if our behavior and feeling toward our fellow men are the subject matter of ethics, how could sexual behavior one of the most significant expressions of a person's relatedness to others-be excluded from the realm of ethical judgment? If we believe that love, respect, and responsibility for others are fundamental ethical values, sexual behavior must be judged in terms of these values. Inasmuch as the particular form of sexual satisfaction is rooted in a person's character it can be judged as any other characterologically significant behavior.
An example of the connection between sexual behavior and genuine ethical problems is the most ancient and universal sexual taboo, the incest taboo, as we find it in various forms in all primitive cultures as well as in our own. But even today the prohibition of incest has retained its taboo quality and has not been connected with the problem of character and of rational ethics. If it were true, as most people assume, that incest is a rare perversion which has little relevance in our own culture, there would be no need for discussing this problem. But while it is true that incest in the crude form of sexual desires between relatives is comparatively rare, it becomes a very acute problem, indeed, if we understand how incestuous desires are rooted in our character.
Incestuous love can be understood here as a symbol. It symbolizes the inability to love "the stranger," that is, a person with whom we are not "familiar" and not related by ties of blood and early intimacy. Its supplement is xenophobia, the hate and distrust of "the stranger." Incest is a symbol of the warmth and security of the womb and of the dependence on the navel-string in contradistinction to mature independence. Only if one can love"the stranger," only if one can recognize and relate oneself to the human core of another person can one experience oneself as a human being, and only if one can experience oneself as a human individuality can one love "the stranger." We have overcome incest in the narrow sense of the word, as sexual relations between members of the same family, but we still practice incest not in a sexual but in a characterological sense, inasmuch as we are not capable of loving "the stranger," a person with different social background. Race and nationalistic prejudices are the symptoms of incestuous elements in our contemporary culture. We shall have overcome incest only when we-every one of us-are able not only to think of but to feel and to accept the stranger as our brother.
The problem of sex and happiness is closely related to the ethical problem we have just discussed. To the assumption that the condition for happiness, the reaction was that sexual satisfaction was the paramount condition for happiness if not identical with it. Freud and his school emphasized that sexual satisfaction was one condition for mental health and happiness. Today it is widely advocated and believed that marital happiness is based primarily on sexual satisfaction and that marital unhappiness can be cured bu applying better sexual techniques. However, the facts do not seem to bear out these assumptions. True enough, many neuroses are coupled with sexual disturbances and many unhappy people suffer also from sexual frustrations; but is is not true that sexual satisfaction is the cause of-or identical with-mental health and happiness. Often psychoanalysts see patients whose ability to love and so be close to other is damaged and yet who function very well sexually and indeed make sexual satisfaction a substitute for love because their sexual potency is their only power in which they have confidence. Their inability to be productive in all other spheres of life and the resulting unhappiness is counterbalanced and veiled by their sexual activities. The meaning of sexual desires and their satisfaction can be determined only with reference to the character structure. Sexual desires can be the expression of fear, vanity, or of a with for domination, and they can be the expression of love. The question whether sexual satisfaction is conducive to happiness depends entirely on its role within the total character structure.
The discussion of the relationship between sexual satisfaction and happiness even in the sketchy form of this paper must pay attention to a fundamental controversy with regard to the concept of happiness. One view maintains that happiness must be defined entirely in subjective terms. In this view happiness is identical with the satisfaction of any kind of desire a person may have. Happiness is looked upon as a matter of taste and preference, irrespective of the quality of the particular desire. In contrast to this relativestic position, which is the dominant one today in the popular mind, the position represented in the tradition of humanistic philosophy, from Plato and Aristotele to Spinoza and Dewey, has emphasized that happiness, while not at all identical with obedience to norms given by an external authority, nevertheless is also not "relative" but subject to norms which follow from the nature of man. "Happiness is the indication that man has found the answer to the problem of human existence: the productive realization of his potentialities and thus, simultaneously, being one with the world and preserving the integrity of his self. In spending his energy productively he increases his powers, he burns without being consumed.
"Happiness is the criterion of excellence in the art of living, of virtue in the meaning it has in humanistic ethics." (Fromm 1947a, 189)
the assumption that happiness results from sexual satisfaction alone and not from our capacity to love tends to camouflage and to befog the issue just as much as the Victorian prejudice against sexual satisfaction did. In both instances sex is isolated from the total personality and considered good or evil in itself, while it can be evaluated only in the context of the total character structure. Mere negation of the Victorian moral code remains sterile.
"Happiness is not the reward of virtue, but is virtue itself; nor do we delight in happiness because we restrain our lusts; but, on the contrary, because we delight in it, therefore are we able to restrain them." (Spinoza, Ethics)
If we believe in the significance sexual behavior has for the understanding of character, the Kinsey Report must be considered of great importance for the study of "social character." By "social character" I refer to the core of the character common to most members of a culture, in contradistinction to the individual character, in which people belonging to the same culture differ from one another. A society is not something outside of the individuals which it is composed of, but it is the totality of these many individuals. The emotional forces which are operating in most of its members become powerful forces in the social process, stabilizing, changing, or disrupting it.
The study of the social character is the main topic of the problem of "personality and culture" which has become one focus of attention in contemporary social science. Unfortunately, progress in this field has been slow so far. One has relied much too exclusively on gathering data on what people think (or believe that they are supposed to think) instead of studying the emotional forces behind their thinking. while opinion polls are significant for certain purposes, we need to know morel they are not the tool for understanding the forces operating underneath the surface of opinion. Only if we know these forces are we able to predict how the members of a society will react in critical situations to those ideas which they profess to believe in and to new ideologies which they now reject. From the standpoint of social dynamics every opinion is worth only as much as the emotional matrix in which it is rooted.
But far from having a picture of the social character in its totality, we do not even have studies of the most urgent specific problems. What, for instance, do we know about happiness of people in our culture? True enough, many people would answer in an opinion poll that they were happy because this is what a self-respecting citizen is supposed to feel. But the degree of genuine happiness or unhappiness in our culture is any body's guess, and yet it is this very knowledge which can answer the question whether our institutions fulfill the purpose they are devised for: the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Or what do we know about the degree of which ethical considerations and not mere fear of disapproval or punishment influence the behavior of modern man? Tremendous expenditures in energy and money are made to increase the weight of ethical motivations. Yet we know hardly anything, beyond mere guesswork, about the success of these efforts.
Or to take another illustration-what do we know of the degree and intensity of the destructive forces to be found in the average person in our culture? While it cannot be denied that our hopes for peaceful and democratic development depend largely on the assumption that the average man is not possessed by intense destructiveness, nothing has been done to ascertain the facts. The opinion that most people are basically destructive is as unproven as the opinion that the opposite is true. Social scientists so far have done little to shed light on this crucial issue.
The reason for the neglect to study these fundamental problems of character and culture is largely to be found in the attitude of most social psychologists. They believe that unless phenomena can be studied in a way which permits of exact and quatitative analysis they must not be studied at all. They try to imitate methods successul in natural sciences and make a fetish of "the" scientific method. Instead of devising new methods proper to the study of significant problems in their own field, namely, people and life processes, they choose those problems for study which fit the requirements of laboratory methods. Their choice of problems is determined by the method instead of the method being determined by the problem.
Kinsey's survey ought to be very stimulating to social scientists for two reasons: (1) Its data throw light on one aspect of behavior and hence, if properly interpreted, on the social character. (2) Kinsey has succeeded in unearthing relevant data in a field which was believed to be impenetrable. Although methods for studying the social character must necessarily differ from the quantitative-statistical method legitimately used by Kinsey for the study of sexual behavior, the difficulties in devising and applying proper methods for social characterology are not insurmountable. Empirical investigations studying the forces underlying mass behavior will yield significant results if social psychologists approach their problems with the same courage and energy which Kinsey and his collaborators have demonstrated in their work.